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WAGING WAR WITH WAL-MART:
A CRY FOR CHANGE THREATENS THE FUTURE
OF INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS
Zachariah J. Lloyd ∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart, America’s behemoth one-stop-shop, boasts astronomical
statistics: two million employees worldwide; $374.5 billion in sales for
the fiscal year ending January 31, 2008; more than 4,100 locations in the
United States alone, spanning approximately 600 million square feet of
retail space; and more than 176 million customers per year. 1 Despite
these staggering figures, “[f]ew efforts illustrate the breadth of WalMart’s ambitions . . . as much as a nearly decade-long drive to establish
its own bank.” 2
After a firestorm of criticism from banking industry officials 3 and
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1. Wal-Mart, Inc., Corporate Facts, http://www.walmartfacts.com/FactSheets/
3142007_Corporate_Facts.pdf [hereinafter Corporate Facts] (last visited Oct. 26, 2008);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 Annual Report (Form 10-K), http://walmartstores.com/sites
/AnnualReport/2008/docs/wal_mart_annual_report_2008.pdf, at 2-4 [hereinafter Annual Report].
2. Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17bank.html.
3. See Letter from Camden R. Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of
Am., to Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Aug. 18, 2005), at 1,
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consumer watchdog groups, 4 legislative threats from lawmakers, 5 and
an extended moratorium freezing all Industrial Loan Corporation
(“ILC”) 6 applications by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), 7 Wal-Mart withdrew its most recent attempt to secure a bank
charter – an ILC 8 – on March 16, 2007. 9 Despite its lack of success, this
attempt by the world’s largest retailer to enter the world of banking
stoked anew the flames of controversy surrounding America’s age-old
public policy: to keep banking and commercial entities separate.
Specifically, it highlighted the surge in ILCs and the subsequent brickby-brick dismantling of the wall dividing the banking and commercial
worlds. 10
Although ILCs have existed with relatively little fanfare for decades
(and several blue chips already control ILCs of their own), 11 Wal-Mart’s
ILC application created unprecedented opposition; drastic calls for
legislative action came from nearly every arena to prevent Wal-Mart and
other giant retailers from controlling a banking institution. The purpose
of this Article, therefore, is to chronicle the development of the ILC
industry and to analyze whether the separation of banking and comavailable at http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/ltr081805.pdf.
4. See Dash, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. As of March 17, 2004, Utah law was amended to rename the industry from
Industrial Loan Corporations (ILCs) to Industrial Banks. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-21
(2006). This article will use the term “ILC” to refer to both Industrial Loan Corporations and Utah Industrial Banks.
7. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Board of Directors order executed by FDIC
Executive Secretary Robert E. Feldman, FDIC Notice No. 6714-01-P, Moratorium on
Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices (July 2006) pt. IV,
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06073a.html (imposing a sixmonth moratorium, effective through January 31, 2007, on FDIC action “to (i) accept,
approve, or deny any application for deposit insurance submitted to the FDIC by, or on
behalf of, any proposed or existing ILC, or (ii) accept, disapprove, or issue a letter of
intent not to disapprove, any change in bank control notice submitted to the FDIC with
respect to any ILC”).
8. See id. at pt. I (noting that “[w]hile ILCs are ‘banks’ under the FDI Act, [12
U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)], they generally are not ‘banks’ under the Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA) [12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)]”).
9. See Dash, supra note 2, at C1.
10. Karen L. Werner, Community Banks: Banking Coalition Seeks House Support
For ILC Compromise After Wal-Mart Request, 85 BANKING REP. 230 (2005).
11. See infra Part II.A.1(b).
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merce is a justifiable basis for opposing ILCs. Part II will address the
history of the ILC from its creation to its emergence as the banking
entity of choice for some of the Nation’s largest financial and commercial companies; Wal-Mart’s role in advancing the controversy; and the
regulatory and legislative responses to large commercial entities seeking
to control ILCs. Part III will address the separation of banking and
commerce as it relates to ILCs. It will also set forth three different solutions available to Congress, and will discuss the impact that the implementation of proposed legislation will have on the ILC industry as a
whole, and on the State of Utah in particular. This Article concludes that
in the absence of any risk peculiar to commercially-affiliated ILCs, and
in light of the regulatory success of the FDIC and Utah Department of
Financial Institutions (“Utah DFI”), a wall of separation should not be
erected between ILCs and commercial holding companies. Rather, ILCs
should continue to receive charters, so long as there is sufficient regulatory supervision to manage the risks inherent in their holding structure.

II. THE CONTROVERSY
A. ILC Overview: From Creation to Expansion to Explosion
1.

ILC Growth and Development

According to a report by the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO Report”), ILCs are “state-charted financial institutions that
emerged in the twentieth century to provide consumer credit to low and
moderate income workers who were generally unable to obtain consumer loans from commercial banks.” 12 Although most ILC deposits were
not insured by the FDIC until the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Act
of 1982, 13 these financial institutions raised capital by issuing
investment certificates and taking deposits. The ILCs then used these

12. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. 05-621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT
DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 1, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d05621.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
13. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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funds to make unsecured, high interest loans to consumers. 14 In the last
ten years, however, an increased interest in owning ILCs by commercial
entities has caused the ILC industry to experience “significant asset
growth.” 15
(a) ILC Statutory Creation and Advantages
Like other “non-bank” banks that neither accepted demand deposits
nor made commercial loans, 16 ILCs were originally exempted from the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”) 17 , which prohibited
bank holding companies from engaging in insurance, securities underwriting, or commercial business. 18 As a result, many banking institutions
participated in only one of the permissible activities – accepting demand
deposits or making commercial loans – to avoid classification and regulation as a “bank” under the BHC Act. In response to the growing number of such “non-bank” banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (“Federal Reserve Board”) enacted the Competitive
Equality Banking Act (“CEBA”), redefining the term “bank” under the
BHC Act to include any FDIC-insured bank. 19 The CEBA strengthened
the BHC Act’s supervisory reach by subjecting all non-excepted FDICinsured banks to consolidated supervision 20 and by bringing them within
the scope of the BHC Act’s limitations on bank holding companies. 21
Except for a limited number of qualifying institutions, entities that
own or control insured depository institutions generally may engage,
directly or through subsidiaries, only in activities that are financial in
nature. 22 With respect to ILCs, however, the CEBA excepted from the
BHC Act four types of ILCs because they did not fall within the definition of “bank”:
14. Raymond Natter, The Industrial Loan Corporation Controversy, FIN. SERVICES
INST. July 2005 ¶ 3.
15. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 15.
16. Natter, supra note 14.
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843 (2006).
18. Id.
19. Id. at ¶ 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843, 1467a(c) (2006). Grandfathered unitary thrift holding companies are not subject to these activities restrictions. Limited purpose credit card banks
are also exempt from the BHC Act. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(F).
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(i)

an ILC that does not accept demand deposits which the
depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties;
(ii) an ILC that has less than $100 million in total assets;
(iii) an ILC that has not undergone a change in control after the
date of enactment of the CEBA (i.e., August 10, 1987); and
(iv) an ILC that does not, directly or through an affiliate, engage
in any activity in which it was not lawfully engaged as of
March 5, 1987. 23
Notably, exceptions (i) through (iii) do not require the ILC to have
been in existence as of a certain date. Thus, a new ILC may be chartered
in any state that permits such entities and may avoid being subject to the
BHC Act, provided it meets one of these three exceptions. 24 Therefore,
on one hand these exceptions for ILCs arguably create special supervisory risks, because an ILC’s parent company and non-banking affiliate
might not be subject to supervision on a consolidated basis by a federal
agency such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), or the
National Credit Union Association. 25
ILCs are now “the only federally-insured depository institutions
with the authority to offer a broad range of banking products and
services in a holding company structure exempt from the [BHC Act].” 26
Thus, neither the holding company nor its subsidiaries are restricted in
any way as to the services or products they may offer. FDIC insurance
permits ILCs to generate funds through deposits, which are often the
most cost-effective way to acquire funding. 27 Additionally, ILCs share
with FDIC-insured institutions the ability to “export” their home state’s
usury laws – laws regarding interest and finance charges – regardless of
where their customers reside. 28
Yet another advantage of ILCs is their ability to become an originator of “Visa or MasterCard credit, debit, charge, and business cards.”29
23. Natter, supra note 14, ¶ 5 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i)(I-III), (ii)
(2006)).
24. Id. ¶ 8.
25. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
26. George Sutton, Industrial Banks, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 178, 179 pt.
III.A (2002).
27. Id. at 180 pt. III.B.
28. Id. at 180 pt. III.E.
29. Id. at 180 pt. III.F.
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Each ILC is chartered and regulated by the state banking commissioner
in the state in which the institution is based. As will be addressed below,
virtually all ILCs established in recent years have been chartered and
regulated by the State of Utah. 30
(b) Major Participants in the ILC Market
In the time since the CEBA’s passing, ILCs have emerged from
relative obscurity and have grown into an industry with over $212.8
billion in assets. 31 Today, “the typical [ILC] is owned by a parent
corporation with well established multistate operations.” 32 Most ILCs
offer “specific financial products and services to established customers
of the parent.” 33 Thus, the ILC allows the parent company to “leverage
existing customer relationships” and drive more sales “through established distribution channels.” 34 ILCs offer a versatile depository charter
for companies that are not permitted to, or that choose not to, become
subject to the BHC Act. 35
An overview of the ILC industry revealed that of the sixty-one
existing industrial banks as of August 2006, forty-three were either
independently owned or affiliated with a parent company whose primary
business purpose is financial in nature. 36 Further, these forty-three charters comprised approximately ninety percent of the industry’s assets and
deposits. 37 The other eighteen charters were “associated with parent
companies that can be considered non-financial . . . [and] account for
approximately ten percent of . . . assets and deposits.” 38

30.
31.

Id. at 179 pt. II.
See H.R. REP. NO. 110–155, at 10 (2007). In 1987, the largest ILC had total
assets of $410 million. Id. By 2006, the largest ILC had total assets of $67 billion with
$54 billion in deposits, “making it among the twenty largest [FDIC] insured banks in
terms of deposits.” Id.
32. Sutton, supra note 26, at 179 pt. II.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
36. G. Edward Leary, Remarks of the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions
before Utah Association of Financial Services, 3 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://
www.dfi.utah.gov/PDFiles/IB%20Speech%202006.pdf [hereinafter Leary Remarks].
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Active ILCs that are not independently owned 39 can be categorized
into three distinct business groups. The first group comprises the majority of the active ILCs; they are owned and operated by large and “complex financial institutions with extensive access to the capital markets.”40
These ILCs – such as American Express Centurion Bank ($23.4 billion)
and UBS Bank USA ($23.1 billion) – use the ILC entity to service their
brokerage accounts and make securities-backed loans. 41 The second
group, comprised of commercial and retail corporations such as GMAC
Automotive Bank ($23.5 billion), Target Corporation ($15.3 million),
and GE Capital Financial ($2.2 billion), 42 utilize the ILC as a “financial
arm of larger corporate organization[s]” in order to enhance their retail
operations. 43 The third group, including BMW ($2.4 billion) and
Volkswagen ($288 million), 44 employs the ILC to “directly support the
holding company organizations’ commercial activities.” 45
The variety of ILC business models highlights the ILC’s flexible
utility. Generally, only three particular assets are needed to enter the
financial services market – capital, information technology, and distribution. It is logical, therefore, that most commercial entities with these
assets in hand would gravitate toward the opportunities afforded by the
ILC. As Ross & Sutton observed, “[e]ach company tends to market
specialized [financial] products to [its] national and international markets.” 46 These products may include “general consumer credit cards,
business credit cards, [and] affinity group and private label cards [as

39. The GAO REPORT notes that there are a few ILCs which are “communityfocused, stand-alone institutions such as Golden Security Bank and Tustin Community
Bank.” GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 18. In contrast to most ILCs, these function
much more like traditional community banking institutions. Id.
40. Id.
41. These figures were current as of June 30, 2007. Industrial Loan Companies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 16,
attachment 1 (Oct. 4, 2007) (statement of FDIC Chief Operating Officer John F.
Bovenzi) [hereinafter Bovenzi Attachment]. For current Utah ILC Asset Statistics from
the FDIC, see http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (follow link for “Find Institutions”
and search by “Institution Name”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
42. Id.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 18.
44. Bovenzi Attachment, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. Yan M. Ross & George Sutton, Utah Industrial Loan Corporations: A Fresh
Look Backward and Forward, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 7, 8 (1994).
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well as] . . . small consumer loans, commercial loans . . . , home equity
loans, and auto loans.” 47
(c) Utah’s Emergence as the ILC Industry Leader
As of June 30, 1993, the State of Utah regulated fourteen active
ILCs with just over $1.0 billion in assets. 48 By year-end 2004, twentynine ILCs were chartered in Utah with assets totaling more than $115.0
billion. 49 These twenty-nine ILCs represented eighty-two percent of the
ILC industry’s total assets. 50
Utah’s emergence as the ILC industry leader is attributable to three
primary factors. First, Utah has desirable usury law. 51 Because an ILC
enjoys the same authority as other FDIC-insured institutions to export
the interest rate laws of its home state to every other state in which it
does business, the usury laws of the ILC’s home state are vital. 52 As
Sutton analyzed, “[w]ith minor exceptions, the Utah Consumer Credit
Code (Title 70C of the Utah Code) does not impose caps on interest
rates, finance charges, or other fees that a lender and borrower can
specify in a credit contract.” 53
Second, Utah’s laws are generally business- and institutionallyfriendly. Utah businessmen and legislators have collaborated to be on
the forefront of deregulation of the financial industry, passing laws and
regulations that foster business and financial development. 54 As a result,
Utah has a regulatory framework that benefits both the state and its
financial institutions. Utah’s state regulators continue to work to enable
further improvement and expansion of financial industries while maintaining proper safety and soundness as directed by the FDIC. 55
Third, Utah is a preferred operations site. Salt Lake City is significantly less expensive than other urban areas in terms of operation costs,
yet approximately eighty percent of the state’s population lives within

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 8.
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Sutton, supra note 26, at 180.
Id.
Id.
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forty miles of the city. 56 Additionally, Utah’s “education and literacy
levels are among the highest in the nation” and “productivity levels in
the Utah facilities of many national and international companies are
among the highest in those organizations.” 57 These factors demonstrate
why almost all ILCs established in the last decade have been chartered
in Utah. 58
2.

Regulatory Framework

Under the BHC Act, the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”)
“generally supervises bank holding companies and has established a
consolidated supervisory framework for assessing the risks to a depository institution that could arise because of their affiliation with other
entities in a holding company structure.” 59 The ILC exemption from the
BHC Act, however, removes these institutions from the Fed’s consolidated supervisory framework. This exemption makes up one facet of the
great controversy surrounding the continuing existence of ILCs.60
(a) The FDIC
Exemption from the BHC Act does not remove an ILC from all
federal regulation. According to the GAO Report, “[The] FDIC is the
primary federal supervisor of state-chartered institutions that do not join
the Federal Reserve system, including ILCs.” 61 The FDIC has the same
broad supervisory, regulatory, and enforcement authority over ILCs as it
has over other non-member, insured state banks under its jurisdiction. 62
As the GAO Report noted, the “FDIC’s supervisory authority over the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 180-81.
See id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 11. “As of December 31, 2004, 3 of the top 16 largest insured institutions
supervised by the FDIC were ILCs.” Id. Further, it should be noted that ILCs may
choose whether to be regulated by the FDIC or Federal Reserve Board; no ILCs in Utah
have selected the Federal Reserve Board to be its primary regulator. See Sutton, supra
note 26, at 179.
62. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(2) (2006). See also Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical Perspective, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS
(Div. of Supervision & Consumer Prot. of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), Summer 2004,
at 9-10 (detailing the effectiveness of FDIC supervision of ILCs and the modifications
that it has adopted to improve supervision).
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holding companies and affiliates of ILCs is more limited than the authority that consolidated supervisors have over the holding companies and
affiliates of banks and thrifts.” 63 Further, “[ILCs] are subject to the
same regulations and regulatory standards as any FDIC-insured
commercial bank.” 64
Nevertheless, many banking industry leaders and lawmakers are
critical of the ILC exemption from the BHC Act because they believe
the FDIC does not have the same coercive power to regulate as the consolidated regulators (the Fed or OTS). 65 While a consolidated supervisor is generally able to examine the holding company and any nonbank subsidiary – notwithstanding any relationship the subsidiary has
with the affiliated insured bank – the “FDIC’s authority to examine an
affiliate of an insured depository institution is limited to examinations
necessary to disclose fully the relationship between the institution and
any affiliate and the effect of the relationship on the institution.” 66
However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act bolsters the express
examination power with a statutory grant to the FDIC to “exercise by its
Board of Directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, all powers . . .
necessary to carry out the powers so granted.” 67 Additionally, in view
of the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “incidental powers” in
the banking context, 68 the FDIC has plenary powers that historically
have resulted in supervisory results comparable to those of the
consolidated supervisors. 69 As Part II will argue, however, more so than

63.
64.
65.

GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
Sutton, supra note 26, at 179.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-7 (expressing skepticism as to the
FDIC’s ability to supervise effectively a large and complex ILC holding company,
especially in a time of financial stress); Fine, supra note 3, at 5 (“While the FDIC
would have the authority and tools to address safety and soundness problems confined
to the Wal-Mart ILC, it lacks the essential tools the [BHC Act] gives the Federal
Reserve [Board] to oversee and supervise bank holding companies and ensure the safe
operation of the overall enterprise.”).
66. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-7; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4)(A) (2006)
(setting forth the FDIC’s examination authority of affiliates).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006).
68. See NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 25758 (1995) (construing “business of banking” language of the National Bank Act broadly
to permit the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to decide that small banks could
sell annuities).
69. See generally West, supra note 62 at 11-13 (discussing a recent FDIC staff
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these statutory and judicial enhancements, the FDIC’s regulatory track
record offers convincing proof of the adequacy and sustainability of the
FDIC’s supervisory powers. 70
(b) Utah Department of Financial Institutions
Each ILC is chartered and regulated by the state banking
commissioner in the state where the institution is based. 71 All ILCs in
Utah are chartered and regulated by the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions (“Utah DFI”). 72 The Utah DFI has robust, plenary authority
over both its ILCs and the companies that control them under Utah Code
Title 7. 73 Its Commissioner also has broad supervisory, regulatory and
enforcement authority over Utah ILCs that parallels the FDIC’s authority. The Utah DFI’s supervisory authority includes the right to examine
the ILC and to take enforcement and remedial actions against the ILC
and its affiliates. 74 Its enforcement powers include: the right to issue
cease and desist orders; 75 remove officers and directors; 76 take possession of the institution; 77 and enforce supervisory acquisitions and mergers. 78 The Utah DFI’s regulatory power also brings ILCs within the
scope of “the same laws and regulations, as well as standards for safe
and sound lending practices,” as other Utah commercial banks. 79
The Utah ILC application process closely mirrors that of the FDIC;
study setting forth the FDIC’s excellent track record supervising ILCs and noting that of
the twenty-one ILCs that have failed, none was either a Utah ILC or owned by a
commercial entity).
70. See infra Part II.C.1.
71. See UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., WHAT IS A UTAH INDUSTRIAL BANK?, http://
www.dfi.utah.gov/whatisIB.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
72. Id.
73. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-201 (2008) (providing that Department of
Financial Institutions is responsible for “the execution of the laws of this state relating
to all financial institutions and other persons subject to this title, and relating to the
businesses they conduct”); see also Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 5-6 (setting forth
the Utah DFI’s examination procedures).
74. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-314, -510 (2008).
75. Id. § 7-1-307.
76. Id. § 7-1-308.
77. Id. § 7-1-510.
78. Id. § 7-1-313, -314.
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 24. The GAO Report also notes that California,
the other state with any significant concentration of ILC assets, has similarly subjected
its ILCs to the same standards and regulatory limitations as its commercial banks. Id.
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an ILC applicant may thus file the FDIC application in lieu of filing the
application for the ILC charter with the State of Utah. 80 The Utah DFI
considers various factors when determining whether to approve applications for ILC charters. The weight accorded to each factor depends on
the business model of each ILC applicant. 81 Some of these factors
include:
•
•
•

•

•

•

The character, reputation and financial standing of
the organizer(s).
Whether the organizers have the capital resources to
support an ILC.
The establishment of a Utah organization in which
autonomous decision making authority and responsibilities reside with the board and management such
that they are in control of the ILC’s activities and
direction.
Utah-based management that has knowledge, expertise and experience in operating a depository institution in a regulated environment.
Management that is independent of the parent;
however, goals and policies attributed to the parent
may be carried out by the ILC if defined in the ILC’s
business plan.
A bona fide business plan and defined purpose for
the existence of the ILC, including deposit taking as
an integral component, with at least three years of
pro forma projections and supporting data. 82

Imposition of these factors by the regulator is meant to ensure that
each ILC has sufficient autonomy, is insulated from the parent company,
and is “held accountable for ensuring that all bank operations and business functions are performed in compliance with banking regulations
and in a safe and sound manner.” 83
In addition to the initial review conducted before the approval of a
depository charter – and as with all depository institutions – ILCs are
subject to safety and soundness examinations by the Utah DFI and the

80.
81.
82.
83.

See UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 71.
See id.
Id.
West, supra note 62, at 9.
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FDIC. 84 These annual examinations are usually conducted jointly by the
two regulators. 85 The Utah DFI has over forty-two field examiners who
are experienced in conducting regular examinations of holding companies, and it plans “to provide further training and increase [its] number
[of examiners] so that [it] can conduct, independently, if need be,
holding company inspections of all financial institution holding companies registered in Utah.” 86 Propelled by this regulatory framework and
the exceptions under the BHC Act, ILCs have grown out of relative
obscurity to include among their ranks one of the twenty largest FDICinsured banks. 87
B. Wal-Mart’s Efforts to own a Bank
Sam Walton opened his first discount store in 1962. 88 Over the
ensuing forty-six fiscal years, Wal-Mart’s corporate footprint permeated
communities in every state and thirteen countries worldwide to include
1,589 discount stores, 2,794 Supercenters, 713 Sam’s Clubs, and 134
Neighborhood Markets. 89 Its 1.4 million American employees make it
the nation’s largest employer and it sits atop the Fortune 500. 90 Yet,
despite its remarkable growth and repeated efforts, Wal-Mart has been
unable to accomplish a primary objective – to acquire its own banking
institution.
1. Past Attempts
Wal-Mart commenced its quest to own a bank in June 1999 when it
84.
85.
86.

UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 71.
Id.
Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 6. Additionally, Commissioner Leary stated
that “Utah is participating with the FDIC in the Large Bank Supervision Program for
four [ILCs]” and “[t]he supervision of these large banks is coordinated by a full-time
relationship manager for [Utah] as well as the FDIC.” Id. These examiners instigate a
bank-specific regulatory and supervisory plan that usually “involves three targeted
reviews that roll-up to an annual Examination Report that is reviewed with [both ILC]
management and the board.” Id.
87. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 10 (2007).
88. See Wal-Mart Stores History, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/297.aspx (last
visited Oct. 28, 2008).
89. Annual Report, supra note 1, at 53.
90. Corporate Facts, supra note 1; Christopher Tkaczyk, Fortune 500: The Top 50,
FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 2007, at 210, available at http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/
fortune/0704/gallery.500top50.fortune/index.html.
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applied to purchase a small thrift in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma named
the Federal Bank Center. 91 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 92 (“GrammLeach”), passed by Congress in November 1999, “blocked this attempt .
. . by closing the ‘unitary thrift holding company’ loophole 93 and
reaffirming the nation’s policy of separating banking and commerce.” 94
This was the first of many times during the course of Wal-Mart’s quest
that its efforts to own a bank would be stymied by national legislative
opposition.
Wal-Mart’s next attempt to acquire a bank was made in 2001
through a strategic alliance with Toronto-Dominion Bank USA (“TD
Bank”) allowing TD Bank to offer its banking services in approximately
100 Wal-Mart stores. 95 Wal-Mart’s plan to share in the bank’s profits,
however, and to have its associates perform transactions within those
banks, led to the merger’s rejection by OTS because it would “give WalMart unauthorized control over TD Bank.” 96
Undaunted, Wal-Mart turned its attention to the ILC structure by
attempting to acquire a small, bankrupt California ILC named Franklin
Bank in 2002. 97 This time the California legislature stepped in by
passing legislation that prevented “non-financial institutions from acquiring state-chartered [ILCs] unless they are ‘engaged in the activities
permitted for financial holding companies’ as established by [GrammLeach].” 98 California governor Gray Davis stated that he signed the pro-

91. See Bloomberg News, Wal-Mart Wants To Buy Savings And Loan, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1999, at C31; Kevin Nolan, Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company: The Risk
to Community Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187, 191 (2006).
92. Pub. L. No. 160-102, 113 Stat.1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1811).
93. Nolan, supra note 91, at 191 n.37. Interestingly, Congress grandfathered in
exempted thrifts approved before May 4, 1999, a date carefully chosen to exclude an
application from Wal-Mart. Id. at 191.
94. Id. A unitary thrift holding company was a holding company owned by a
commercial company that owned only one savings and loan or thrift institution and was
thereby exempt from limitations on the nature of the activities conducted by its
commercial subsidiaries. Id. at 200.
95. Id. at 191 (citing Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart, TD Venture Hits Regulatory Wall,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 1).
96. Id. at 191-92.
97. Id. at 192 (citing Wal-Mart Drops the Other Shoe, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
WK., July 26, 2005).
98. Id.; 2002 Cal. Stat. 1162.
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hibitive legislation “in accordance with the federal prohibition against
mixing banking and commerce, as intended by [Gramm-Leach].” 99
2. The Utah ILC Application
March 16, 2007 marked the end of the most recent chapter of WalMart’s historic mission to acquire its own bank. 100 The nearly eighteenmonth effort to charter a Utah ILC, which began in July 2005, 101 came
to a close when Wal-Mart withdrew its application amidst swelling
controversy and the extension of an FDIC moratorium 102 on all ILC
applications for FDIC insurance by non-financial institution
applicants. 103
According to Wal-Mart’s application, its major purpose in
acquiring a Utah-chartered ILC was to process credit, debit and electronic check transactions. 104 Denis Bouchard, Wal-Mart’s director of
payments services, said “the bank will serve as an acquirer of credit
transactions in the Visa and MasterCard systems, and will be a sponsor
for debit transactions in ACH [Automated Clearing House] transactions.” 105 Presently, Wal-Mart uses First Data to process an estimated
sixty percent of its millions of annual transactions, totaling approximately $172 billion per year. 106 Savings on transactional costs would be
an estimated $650 million annually. 107 Thus, Wal-Mart’s staunch desire
to charter an ILC is certainly understandable.
However, the biggest fear of banking industry leaders and lawmakers who opposed Wal-Mart’s application was not that Wal-Mart
would charter an ILC in order to more cost-efficiently process credit
transactions, but rather that it likely would have expanded its business

99. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor, to Members of the C.A. State Assembly
(Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author), available at 2002 Cal. ALS 1162 (LEXIS).
100. See Dash, supra note 2.
101. Wal-Mart Drops the Other Shoe, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS WK., July 26, 2005.
102. See infra note 132.
103. See infra Part II.C.1.
104. See Josh Gerstein, AFL-CIO Opposes Wal-Mart Plan To Set Up Bank, THE
N.Y. SUN, Aug. 15, 2005, at A1 (stating that Wal-mart’s ILC would be limited to
handling electronic payments and issuing short-term certificates of deposit to individual
investors and nonprofit organizations).
105. See Wal-Mart Drops the Other Shoe, supra note 101.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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model once the initial three-year period following its charter by the
FDIC expired. 108
According to federal and Utah law, once an ILC has been established and receives FDIC insurance, it is only restricted to its original
business plan for the first three years of the ILC’s existence. 109 After
three years, an ILC may seek approval for an amendment to its original
charter from the FDIC and Utah DFI to expand its business and conduct
full-service banking. 110 Thus, it is possible that a Wal-Mart ILC would
eventually be able to expand its charter beyond merely processing credit
transactions to engage in any practice of a commercial bank permitted
by law. 111
If approved, an amendment to Wal-Mart’s ILC charter would allow
Wal-Mart to immediately open branches in twenty-two states. 112 As one
author summarized, “[f]ive states provide for ILC charters and seventeen
additional states agreed to the ‘opt-in’ provision under the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994” that authorized reciprocal arrangements. 113 Thus, banks chartered in one state are permitted to
branch into all other “opt-in” states without obtaining any additional
consent by state officials. 114 This relatively easy transition from being a
limited ILC to having the ability to branch into nearly half of the states

108. See Fine, supra note 3, at 2-3 (highlighting Wal-Mart’s repeated efforts to enter
the banking industry as evidence that the likelihood of expansion of its ILC charter is
quite high).
109. Press Release, Paul E. Gillmor, Congressman, Ohio’s Fifth Cong. Dist.,
Congressman Gillmor Requests a Full Investigation of the Wal-Mart Bank Application
(Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.walmartwatch.com/img/documents/20050923_Gillmor_
letter_to_FDIC_Chairman_Powell.doc [hereinafter Gillmor Release].
110. 12 C.F.R. § 333.101(a) (2007). The typical change, which might require the
prior written consent of the FDIC, would be to exercise trust powers. Id. § 333.101(b).
Yet, an ILC may engage in any practice permitted by law after three years without the
FDIC’s prior consent if such a change would not be considered a change in the general
character or type of business of the ILC. Gillmor Release, supra note 109.
111. Gillmor Release, supra note 109. So long as the Wal-Mart ILC is in compliance with its original business plan with the FDIC for the first three years, it will only
need to notify the FDIC of its change in the general character of business and will not
need consent. See 12 C.F.R. 333.101(a) (2007).
112. Wal-Mart and Financial Services: Supercentre Banking, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3,
2005, at 2; Gillmor Release, supra note 109.
113. Nolan, supra note 91, at 190; see 12 U.S.C. 36(g) (2006).
114. Nolan, supra note 91, at 190-91.
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explains why community banks nationwide were intensely opposed to
the prospect of a Wal-Mart banking institution. 115
3.

Bank Branching and Wal-Mart’s Expansive Ambitions

Before Wal-Mart eventually abandoned its efforts to charter the
Utah ILC, it stated in a comment to the first FDIC moratorium on all
ILC applications that it would be willing to accept a charter approved by
the FDIC that included a ban on branching. 116 According to Jane
Thompson, the President of Wal-Mart Financial Services, Wal-Mart had
no desire to establish branches or engage in lending, and the ILC was
“not a bank a consumer [would] ever see.” 117 In addition, Thompson
pointed out that Wal-Mart actively encourages community banks to
open branches in its stores. 118
Against the backdrop of these comments, however, two critical
historical trends surrounding Wal-Mart’s development deserve mentioning. First, Wal-Mart already has a long history of branching out into
markets in which it previously stated it had no interest. 119 Second, as
critics of its ILC charter and business model argue, once Wal-Mart
enters into new markets it uses “predatory pricing and other techniques
to run all local competition out of business.” 120 Camden Fine, President
of the Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”), noted
115. See Wal-Mart’s Utah ILC Application Running into Flack, ELECTRONICS
PAYMENTS WK., Nov. 1, 2005; see also Werner, supra note 10, at 230 (documenting
efforts by a collation of banks to urge Congress to not allow a Wal-Mart bank).
116. Comment Submitted by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to FDIC Request for Comment,
71 Fed. Reg. 49456 (Aug. 23, 2006). The FDIC has developed conditions that may be
imposed when approving deposit insurance applications for institutions that will be
owned by or significantly involved in transactions with commercial or financial
companies. See West, supra note 62, at 10 (citing a list of conditions the FDIC has
applied in the past).
117. Rob Garver, Wal-Mart’s Financial Vision In Retail: Focus on Unbanked,
Partnerships, Home Grown ATMs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5. 2005, at 5.
118. Id. As of the date of its Utah ILC application, Wal-Mart had arrangements with
more than 300 banks operating more than 1,100 branches in Wal-Mart stores across the
country. Id.
119. Shaheen Pasha, Wal-Mart Bank Faces Tough Opposition, CNNMONEY.COM,
Jan. 4, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/04/news/companies/walmart_bank/index.
htm.
120. Letter from Sound Banking Coalition to John F. Carter, Reg’l Dir., Fed.
Deposit Insur. Corp., at 5-6 (Aug. 17, 2005) available at http://www.icba.org/files/IC
BASites/PDFs/sbc081705.pdf.
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this checkered past: “Fifteen years ago, Wal-Mart said it had no designs
on the grocery business and 20 years ago, they said they had no designs
on the hardware business but now they dominate both businesses.” 121
Evidence of this repetitive cycle surfaced on June 20, 2007 when,
only months after withdrawing its ILC application and denying intentions of branching banks, Wal-Mart announced plans to open 1,000
“financial-service centers” by 2009. 122 In a partnership with Visa,
General Electric Co.’s ILC, and the Green Dot automated-teller network,
customers at 450 Wal-Mart MoneyCenters would be able to cash
checks, pay bills, and use a prepaid Wal-Mart-brand Visa nationwide. 123
Thus, ICBA President Fine declared, “Wal-Mart wants in to the financial-services business and they’re going to try every way conceivable to
do that.” 124 Further, Steve Verdier, an ICBA lobbyist affirmed, “[i]t
looks like they’re building the infrastructure for a nationwide network of
bank branches.” 125 Thus, contrary to its recent statements, it seems WalMart may indeed have intentions of expanding its broad array of in-store
departments 126 to include many banking and financial services.
Typically, after Wal-Mart expands into another sector of the market
and reduces local competition – or does away with it entirely – WalMart frequently increases its own prices. 127 The rippling effects of these
two historical trends are far-reaching. An Iowa State University study
revealed that after Wal-Mart’s expansion into Iowa, 555 grocery stores,
298 hardware stores, 293 building materials stores, and 116 drug stores
closed their doors. 128 Other studies indicate that “for every Wal-Mart
121.
122.

Pasha, supra note 119.
Lauren Colman-Lochner, Wal-Mart Will Open 1,000 Financial Centers by
2009, BLOOMBERG, June 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a3P.tll8xX1w.
123. Id.
124. Telephone Interview with Camden R. Fine, President, Indep. Cmty. Bankers
Ass’n, in Salt Lake City, Utah (June 21, 2007).
125. Colman-Lochner, supra note 122.
126. Wal-Mart is currently the largest grocery retailer in the United States, as well as
“the nation’s No. 1 retailer of recorded music, DVDs, toys, [and] pet food.” Mary
Deibel, Q & A about Wal-Mart’s bid to branch into banking, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, May 15, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_/
ai_n16365538.
127. Nolan, supra note 91, at 194.
128. DR. KENNETH E. STONE, COMPETING WITH THE DISCOUNT MASS
MERCHANDISERS, 23 tbl. 2 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/
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‘Supercenter’ opened, two local groceries will close.” 129 Therefore, as
Nolan concludes, a Wal-Mart ILC could similarly harm the community
banking industry “[i]f a Wal-Mart ILC charter is amended to include full
retail banking services” in each of its Supercenters nationwide. 130
C. Fallout from Wal-Mart’s Application
1. The FDIC Moratoria
In the first six months following the July 2005 submission of WalMart’s ILC application, the FDIC received approximately 1,700 letters
in total, with the majority vehemently opposing Wal-Mart’s ILC application. 131 By the end of 2006, that number had increased to over 13,800
comment letters. 132 As the letters poured in, members of the House
Committee on Financial Services requested that the FDIC “defer any
decision on the application for federal deposit insurance filed by WalMart Bank until the [FDIC] Board has its full complement of directors,”
because of the importance of the application. 133
By the time one year had elapsed following Wal-Mart’s application,
the ILC controversy was in full bloom. On July 28, 2006, the FDIC issued a moratorium on all states currently chartering ILCs to block any
additional applicants from receiving ILC charters, which effectively
bought some time for the FDIC to assess the risks posed by ILCs to the
FDIC insurance fund and the banking industry. 134 The FDIC posited
faculty/stone/1995_IA_WM_Study.pdf.
129. Nolan, supra note 91, at 194.
130. Id. at 195; see also Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too
Powerful?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 100, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/03_40/b3852001_mz001.htm.
131. Pasha, supra note 119, at 1.
132. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications and Notes, 72 Fed. Reg.
5290, 5291-92 (Feb. 5, 2007).
Approximately 12,485 comments were generated by what appears to be organized
campaigns either supporting or opposing the proposed industrial bank to be owned by
Wal-Mart or the proposed acquisition of Enerbank, also an [ILC], by The Home
Depot. Of this total, approximately 82 percent generally were opposed to the
ownership of [ILCs] by Wal-Mart or other commercial companies.

Id. at 5292.
133. Press Release, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 25 Financial Services Committee
Members Urge FDIC to Wait on Wal-Mart Application (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
https://financialservices.house.gov/pr12162005.html.
134. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71
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twelve questions designed to evaluate the following four issues:
(i)
(ii)

industry developments;
the various issues, facts, and arguments raised with respect
to the ILC industry;
(iii) whether there are emerging safety and soundness issues or
policy issues involving ILCs or other risks to the insurance
fund; and
(iv) whether statutory, regulatory, or policy changes should be
made in the FDIC’s oversight of ILCs in order to protect the
deposit insurance fund or important Congressional objectives. 135
At the conclusion of the six-month moratorium, the FDIC’s muchanticipated decision came in the form of yet another moratorium: a oneyear extension, except this time the stay on applications applied solely to
those submitted by commercial companies, such as Wal-mart. 136 The
FDIC explained in a statement, “the original moratorium demonstrated
that the growth of the ILC industry, the trend toward commercial company ownership of ILCs and the nature of some ILC business models
have raised significant questions about the risks to the deposit insurance
fund.” 137 In addition, the FDIC announced a proposed regulation that
would create a framework for the FDIC to make decisions on the ILCs
owned by financial parents. 138 Ultimately, according to the FDIC, the
moratorium would “provide Congress with an opportunity to address the
issue legislatively[,] while the FDIC consider[ed] how best to respond to
any safety and soundness issues surrounding commercial ownership
under existing law.” 139
2.

Congressional Actions

Since the passing of Gramm-Leach in 1999, which closed the BHC
Fed. Reg. 43482, 43483 (Aug. 1, 2006).
135. Id.
136. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp., FDIC Extends Moratorium on ILC
Applications by Commercial Companies for One Year; Will Move Forward on
Applications from Financial Companies (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.
gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07007.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Act loophole for unitary thrift holding companies, critics have wondered
why Congress chose to expressly reaffirm the separation of banking and
commerce while still excluding ILCs from BHC Act supervision. 140 The
Gillmor-Frank Amendment, sponsored by Barney Frank (D-MA) and
Paul Gillmor (R-OH) in 2005, is representative of the type of changes to
the ILC industry Congress has considered over the past decade. 141 The
amendment provided that the benefits of the ILC exception from consolidated supervision would not extend to any ILC owned by a parent
company that receives fifteen percent or more of its annual gross revenues from non-financial activities. 142 However, although the amendment
passed the House, it was never enacted into law.
While the Gillmor-Frank Amendment failed to gain traction in the
Senate, the Wal-Mart ILC application had clearly catapulted the ILC
controversy back into the financial-sector’s spotlight and Congress took
aim ILCs once again with the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of
2006. 143 While this particular bill did not make it out of committee
before the end of Congress’s term, a nearly identical version of the bill
emerged at the commencement of the next congressional session as the
Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007 (“House Bill 698”).144
This legislation would require an ILC holding company to register and
file certain reports with the FDIC within 180 days after becoming an
ILC holding company. 145 House Bill 698 would also prohibit such a
140. See Peter E. Heyward & Ronald R. Glancz, GAO Report Contributes to the
Industrial Loan Company Debate, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 274 (2006),
available at SL015 ALI-ABA 271, 274 (Westlaw).
141. The language of the Gillmor/Frank Amendment passed the House of
Representatives twice, in the Business Checking Freedom Act of 2005 and the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2005. See Business Checking Freedom Act of 2005,
H.R. 1224, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of
2005, H.R. 3505, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
142. See, e.g., H.R. 1224 § 2(b)(3)(B).
143. H.R. 5746, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (amending the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to establish industrial bank holding company regulation).
144. H.R. 698, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). Congressman Gillmor and Financial
Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank introduced H.R. 698 on January 29, 2007
to help restore the wall between banking and commerce and stem the expansion of the
ILC charter. Press Release, House Comm. On Fin. Servs., Financial Services
Committee Overwhelmingly Passes Industrial Bank Holding Company Act (May 2,
2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/press050
207.shtml. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate. See S. 1356 110th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2007).
145. H.R. 698 § 51(c).
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holding company from being controlled by a commercial firm and
grandfathers in certain institutions to exempt them from its requirements. 146 Under House Bill 698, a company would be considered
“commercial” if it derives 15 percent or more of its gross revenue, on a
consolidated basis, from non-financial activities. 147 The House of Representatives Report discussing the bill (“House Report”) concluded, however, that “[t]hose commercial companies that already own [ILCs] . . .
will be exempt from this prohibition under one of two grandfather
provisions.” 148 House Bill 698 will be addressed further in Part III.B.
Other legislative proposals that Congress has considered over the
past few years have taken an expansive rather than restrictive view of
the ILC industry. The GAO Report notes that recent “legislative proposals would remove the current prohibition on paying interest on demand
deposits and, separately, authorize insured depository institutions,
including most ILCs, to offer interest-bearing business NOW
accounts.” 149 Opponents of ILCs argue this expansion of ILC powers
“could further blur the distinction between ILCs and traditional
banks.” 150 The GAO Report also highlights another legislative proposal
that “would allow banks and most ILCs (those included in a grandfathered provision) to branch into other states through establishing new
branches – known as de novo branching – by removing states’ authority
to prevent them from doing so.” 151 Federal Reserve Board officials have
said that these provisions could yet again “increase the attractiveness of
owning an ILC.” 152 This attractiveness would likely further expand the
ILC industry.

146.
147.
148.
149.

H.R. 698 § 51(f)(3).
H.R. 698 § 51(f)(2).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-155 at 9 (2007).
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76; see H.R. 1224, 109th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1st
Sess. 2005).
150. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76.
151. Id. at 76; see H.R. 1375, 108th Cong. § 401(b) (2d Sess. 2004). In response to
Wal-Mart’s ILC application and the threat of ILCs having the ability to engage in de
novo branching, several states enacted legislation prohibiting an ILC chartered under
the law of another state from establishing an office on the premises or property of the
ILC’s affiliate if that affiliate engages in “commercial” activities. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 6.1-232.2 (Supp. 2007) (repealed effective Feb. 5, 2007, Acts 2007, c.1, cl. 2).
152. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 76.
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In the wealth of comments submitted in response to the FDIC moratoria, countless interest groups, corporations, and law and policy makers
have offered their respective remedies to the ILC controversy. Many
have suggested that the FDIC reject ILC applications from commercial
entities by considering the competitive effects, potential conflicts of
interest, or any other policy concerns. 153 Yet, ultimately, this policy
decision falls on the shoulders of Congress, not the FDIC Board of
Directors. 154
The GAO Report offered three alternative courses of action that
Congress could pursue in order to address the ILC controversy. 155 First,
the report suggested that Congress could eliminate “the current exclusion for ILCs and their holding companies from consolidated supervision.” 156
Second, Congress could grant the “FDIC similar
examination and enforcement authority as a consolidated supervisor.”157
Third, Congress could leave “the oversight responsibility of small, less
complex ILCs with the FDIC, and trans[fer] oversight of large, more
complex ILCs to a consolidated supervisor.” 158 However, as demonstrated by the legislative action (or lack thereof) discussed above in Part
153. See Fine, supra note 3, at 4-5; see Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing on
H.R. 698 before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. at 2 (1st Sess. 2007)
(statement of James P. Ghilglieri Jr., Chairman, Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n).
154. Statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Regarding the ILC
Moratorium Extension at the Meeting of the Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan.
31, 2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-9a.pdf. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815 et seq., sets forth the seven factors the FDIC
may consider in determining whether to extend insurance to a particular institution.
These Factors include: (1) the financial history and condition of the depository
institution; (2) the adequacy of the institution’s capital structure; (3) the future earnings
prospects of the institution; (4) the general character and fitness of the management of
the institution; (5) the risk presented by the institution to the Deposit Insurance Fund;
(6) the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the institution; and (7)
whether the institution’s corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the FDI
Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (2006). These factors expressly mention nothing as to
commercial affiliation. Thus, the only factor where the commercial nature of an
applying entity might plausibly be considered is the risk presented by the institution to
the Bank Insurance Fund.
155. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 81.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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II.C.2, it appears that Congress is either unable or unwilling to plausibly
consider implementation of these alternatives.
The most drastic legislative reform to the ILC industry would
undoubtedly be the complete elimination of the ILC exception from the
BHC Act and consolidated supervision. Yet, with many of America’s
largest and most prolific corporations already owning ILCs 159 –
including commercial giants General Electric and General Motors, as
well as financial services leaders such as Morgan Stanley – complete elimination of the ILC industry is now likely to be out of legislative reach.
Further, it is also unlikely that ILC supervision would shift between the
FDIC and one of the other consolidated regulators such as the Federal
Reserve Board based only on the relative size of the ILC. The
legislative trail leads toward a compromise between the complete
elimination of the ILC exception to the BHC Act, on the one hand, and
unrestricted commercial affiliation, on the other.
Congress must decide not only the fate and future of ILCs owned
by commercial entities, but also the proper regulatory structure,
including both the level of supervision and the federal or state regulatory
entity that can best administer that supervision. These decisions, however, will ultimately depend on the weight given to the long-standing
public policy requiring the separation of banking and commerce.
Part III.A will address the viability of the argument that ILCs
affiliated with commercial entities pose special risks to themselves as
institutions and the banking industry as a whole. Part III.B will then
focus on the effects of proposed legislation – House Bill 698 and any
similar bills that may be on the horizon – on the ILC industry as a whole
and in Utah, in particular.
A. Separation of Banking and Commerce: Does Commercial Affiliation
as Currently Permitted by the ILC Holding Structure Create a
Measurable Risk to the Banking Industry or Institution Itself?
The chief criticism of the ILC exception to the BHC Act and
consolidated supervision is that America is committed to a long-standing
policy – a form of legislative stare decisis 160 – of erecting a wall to
159.
160.

See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) (defining stare decisis as “[t]he
doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”).
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separate banking and commerce. Indeed, Fine has referred to this
metaphorical wall as the “linchpin of the financial and economic system
of the United States.” 161 Fine further argues that the “walls separating
banking and commerce prevent conflicts of interest and undue
concentration of resources, and ensure the impartial allocation of credit
so vital to economic growth and development and to a safe and sound
financial system.” 162 Yet, just how impenetrable is this wall? Is it
erected between banking and all commercial entities, or are there
particular types of commercial institutions that generate a greater need
for a distinct division and heightened fortifications? Or, is the separation
of banking and commerce merely a protectionist partition behind which
bankers, seeking to thwart unwanted competition, retreat to relatively
unquestioned safety from unwanted expansion into the banking
industry?
Proponents of the wall posit three central justifications. 163 First,
allowing the banking and commerce spheres to mix might, in effect,
“lead to an extension of the federal safety net to commercial affiliates
and make insured banks susceptible to the reputational, operational and
financial risks of their commercial affiliates.” 164 Second, banks affiliated with commercial firms may be “less willing to provide credit to the
competitors of their commercial affiliates or may provide credit to their
commercial affiliates at preferential rates or on favorable terms.”165
Third, allowing industrial or financial conglomeration between comercial and banking entities could result in excessive concentration of
resources, with large companies wielding too much power.166
What all three arguments lack, however, is any empirical support
evincing statistically-significant, industry-specific risks posed to both
the banking industry and the deposit insurance fund by ILCs generally
or by commercially-owned ILCs specifically.

161.
162.
163.

Fine, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 71; Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing
on H.R. 698 before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. at 3 (1st Sess. 2007)
(statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed.
Res. System).
164. Kohn, supra note 163, at 7.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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1. Increased Exposure to Reputational, Operational, and
Financial Risks of ILC Affiliates
John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency and member of the
board of directors of the FDIC, said in a statement regarding the FDIC’s
extension of the first ILC moratorium that “the record before us simply
does not establish that commercial affiliations present an undue risk to
the [deposit insurance] fund,” and that “the comments [that the board of
directors of the FDIC] received during the last six months have provided
virtually no empirical evidence to support the proposition that commercially owned ILCs are more risky than non-commercially owned
ILCs.” 167 He acknowledged that when reviewing ILC applications the
FDIC “may take into account potential or hypothetical risk,” but also
stated that “the very best evidence of risk in this area is the FDIC’s own
[twenty]-year experience in supervising ILCs owned by commercial
companies.” 168
Further, in a report created for the FDIC documenting the twentyone ILC failures over the past two decades, no data indicated that any
ILC failed because of commercial affiliation. 169 Similarly, the GAO
Report noted that “from an operations standpoint, ILCs do not appear to
have a greater risk of failure than other types of insured depository
institutions.” 170 As one industry analyst noted, failures of ILCs have not
stemmed from commercial affiliations or the regulatory structure under
which ILCs operate, but rather “from faulty strategic or tactical
decisions.” 171 Thus, like all other failed banks, the ILC failures resulted
from bad management, not risky affiliation.
The 2002 bankruptcy of Conseco, Inc (“Conseco”) is an excellent
example. 172 Conseco was primarily an insurance company until it acquired Green Tree Financial Services (“Green Tree”) in 1998; the
acquisition included Green Tree’s Utah ILC, which was later renamed

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Dugan, supra note 154, at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
West, supra note 62, at 6-8.
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America, The Mixing of Banking
and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 97, 114 (2004),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/article3.pdf.
172. Bloomberg News, Conseco Makes Chapter 11 Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2002, at C4.
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Conseco Bank. 173 Despite its parent’s financial troubles and impending
insolvency, “Conseco Bank’s corporate firewalls and the regulatory
supervision provided by Utah and the FDIC proved adequate.” 174 The
ILC was sold to GE Capital for its book value as part of the Conseco
bankruptcy sale of assets. 175 The Conseco Bank example illustrates the
effectiveness of the FDIC’s regulatory supervision and demonstrates that
ILCs can be steered clear of the financial troubles of their parent
companies.
ILC critics believe that “[t]he potential transfer of risks among insured banks and uninsured commercial affiliates could result in inappropriate risk-taking, misallocation of resources, and uneven competitive
playing fields in other industries.” 176 Yet, while these critics continue to
cite the potential risks resulting from commercial affiliation, these risks
simply have not materialized over the twenty-year history of FDIC
supervision. 177 Conversely, as one author notes, evidence suggests that
with adequate safeguards – corporate firewalls and regulatory supervision – “the careful mixing of banking and commerce can yield benefits
without excessive risk.” 178 Further refuting the threat of systemic risk
and unfair competition posed by ILCs is the fact that “[a]t year-end
2002, [ILCs] held just over $120 billion in assets. This represent[ed]
only 1.4 percent of the total assets held in all [FDIC] insured institutions.” 179 Thus, in terms of total market share and leverage, ILCs pose
very little threat to the banking industry when considered as a whole.
As the remarks of former FDIC Chairman Donald Powell

173. Jeff Bailey, Conseco Agrees to Acquire Green Tree – Exchange of Stock
Valued At About $6.44 Billion; Cross-Selling Plays Role, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1998, at
A2.
174. Blair, supra note 171, at 114.
175. Bloomberg News, Company News; Federal Judge Approves Sale of Conseco
Finance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2003, at C4 (“A Conseco lawyer said the total value of
the deal was $1.37 billion.”); Blair, supra note 171, at 114 (noting that $323 million of
the total amount received in the bankruptcy sale was for the ILC).
176. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 72.
177. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INSUR. CORP., MANDATE FOR CHANGE:
RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY (1987); Blair, supra note 171, at 115; Rose
Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring
Federal Bank Regulation, FDIC BANKING REV., 2005, at 1.
178. Blair, supra note 171, at 117.
179. Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp., Remarks Before the
Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, The ILC Debate: Regulatory and Supervisory Issues
(May 23, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2003/pr5203.html.
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accurately highlight, “[the] risk posed by any depository institution
depends on the appropriateness of the institution’s business plan and
model, management’s competency to run the bank, the quality of the
institution’s risk-management processes and, of course, the institution’s
level of capital.” 180 These are risk characteristics of every insured
institution, not unique to commercially-affiliated ILCs. Further, “[t]he
FDIC believes the ILC charter, per se, poses no greater safety and
soundness risk than other charter types.” 181
2. Distortion of Credit Allocation by Commercially-Affiliated ILCs
The second rationale behind the separation of banking and
commerce – e.g., greater potential for conflicts of interest and favoritism
of affiliates – also appears to be founded on a protectionist ground. A
conflict of interest exists “whenever an entity that serves more than one
interest is in a position to favor one of those interests over the
other(s).” 182 For example, an ILC “affiliated with a commercial firm
may choose to deny loans to the affiliate’s competitors, may choose to
lend preferentially to its commercial affiliate(s), or may illegally tie
loans to purchases of the affiliate’s [goods or services].” 183
Notably, however, the FDIC has cited no conflict of interest that is
unique to bank-commercial affiliations. 184 Sections 23A 185 and 23B 186
of the Federal Reserve Act apply to all FDIC-insured institutions and,
among other things, restrict the amount and terms under which banks
can lend to their affiliates. Section 23B requires transactions between
affiliates to be at arm’s length and on market terms, and must serve “to
prohibit certain tying arrangements.” 187 ILCs, like other supervised
banking institutions, are thus restricted in the type and terms of credit
they can extend to affiliates and must deal with them at arm’s length.
These regulatory restrictions, when combined with entity-internal
firewalls, demonstrate that the “principal potential conflicts [of interest]
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Blair, supra note 171, at 102.
Id.
See id. at 103-04.
12 U.S.C. § 371c (2008).
12 U.S.C. § 371c-1.
Blair, supra note 171, at 103.
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that are offered as a rationale for separating banking and commerce
seem unlikely to pose significant risks to the safety and soundness of the
bank or to the federal safety net.” 188 As former FDIC Chairman Powell
noted, “the firewalls and systems of governance safeguarding ILCs from
misuse by their parent companies are, in many cases, more stringent
than what exists in many affiliates of bank holding companies.”189
Powell further stated that “[d]epending on the purpose and placement of
the [ILC] within the organizational structure, mandated safeguards
include: on-site management rather than management from distant
corporate headquarters, independent boards of directors, strict guidelines
to ensure arms-length transactions with the parent and other affiliates,
and so on.” 190 Lastly, and most importantly, “[r]efusing to lend to the
competitors of its nonbank affiliates or granting credit to its affiliates . . .
on favorable terms” runs counter to market forces because it “serves
only to reduce bank income.” 191
3. Excessive Concentration of Resources from Conglomeration
Between Banking and Commercial Entities
Given Wal-Mart’s corporate statistics, it is easy to see why many
ILC critics are intensely concerned with concentration of resources and
Wal-Mart’s ability to first enter, then dominate, yet another market.
Indeed, the conglomeration argument packs a fair punch, especially
when combined with critics’ contentions under the conflict of interest
argument addressed above. When the BHC Act was enacted, the concern was that the growth of unregulated bank holding companies could
lead to “undue concentration of control in banking activities.” 192 The
BHC Act’s mission was two-fold: “preventing bank monopoly power
from proliferating into nonbanking businesses, and discouraging the
growth of large entities.” 193
However, once again, in today’s competitive banking market, this
threat has failed to materialize. “Conglomerate integration – the combination of banks and nonbanks under a holding company” is unlikely to
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 104.
Powell, supra note 179, at 3.
Id.
Blair, supra note 171, at 105.
Id. at 104 (quoting Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and
Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. Corp. L. 481, 500 (1988)).
193. Id.
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result in monopoly rents because “markets for bank loans are competitive.” It is therefore difficult for a bank to extend market power to nonbanking lines of business. 194 Moreover, “attempts by the bank to engage
in predatory pricing,” (a practice in which Wal-Mart has been accused of
engaging in other markets 195 ) by cross-subsidizing the operations of its
affiliates would work only if there were considerable barriers to entry
into the banking market. 196 In fact, however, although consolidation in
banking has increased over the past decade, interstate banking and competitive markets for small or community banks continue to make it
unlikely that monopoly power will spread from banking to non-banking
business.
In sum, the arguments raised in support of the so-called policy 197
requiring the separation of banking and commerce ultimately lack factual corroboration. As the GAO Report candidly concedes, “generally the
magnitudes of these risks [of mixing banking and commerce] are
uncertain and may depend, in part, upon existing regulatory safeguards
and how effectively banking regulators monitor and enforce these
safeguards.” 198 The issue lies, therefore, not within the industry but
rather in the ability of regulation to ensure the safety and soundness of
the institutions.
4. Conclusion – Mixing of Banking and Commerce May Be Beneficial
This banking and commerce debate is not new; neither is the related
policy question facing lawmakers. Twenty years ago the FDIC’s thenChairman L. William Seidman testified before Congress: “The pivotal
question . . . is: Can a bank be insulated from those who might misuse it
or abuse it? Is it possible to create a supervisory wall around banks that

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
See Fine, supra note 3, at 3.
Blair, supra note 171, at 105.
The separation of banking and commerce has merely been a function of the
demands of the marketplace, level of technology, and the state of development of
organization and business structures and that significant linkages between banking and
commerce have existed and continue to exist despite regulation or prohibition. See
Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that “[a]s the experience of the conventional banking industry shows, the wall separating banking and commerce is elastic” and
has moved and changed over time).
198. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 71.
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insulates them and makes them safe and sound, even from their owners,
affiliates and subsidiaries?” 199 If this analysis is correct, then the debate
should focus on how affiliations should be regulated so that the public
interest is met, i.e. to achieve the greatest possible good for the greatest
possible number of individuals. Regardless where one stands on how to
best serve the “public interest” 200 , certainly the public interest can be
determined only by considering both sides of the debate with respect to
the ILC controversy.
Industry observers have stated that there are many potential benefits
from mixed banking and commerce. First, cost efficiencies can result
from economies of scale (when increasing the scale of operations lowers
the average cost of production) or from economies of scope (when costs
of production are lowered by the production of products that share
inputs). 201 Though these advantages may be difficult to support with
concrete empirical data, they are evidenced by the heightened interest
commercial entities have shown in owning banking institutions in recent
years. Second, “informational efficiencies” and product synergies may
result from affiliation. 202 For example, a bank with an equity position in
a start-up company can use the position to acquire “information about,
and the ability to exercise control over, the commercial firm.” 203 Third,
banking and commerce affiliation could also enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. banks because “many other countries do not place
similar restrictions on the affiliation of banks with commercial entities.” 204 For evidence of these potential benefits, one need only look to
the exponential growth of the ILC industry over the past decade. Moreover, ILC industry advocates note that these potential savings and
revenues may then be “passed on to consumers through lower prices for
banking or commercial services.” 205 Thus, it is the consumer who ultimately reaps the benefit of the commercial affiliation.
In the media, these potential upsides to mixing banking and
commerce go virtually unnoticed. Nevertheless, they are essential to the
199.
200.

Leary Remarks, supra note 36, at 14.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1625 (8th ed. 2004) (defining public welfare as
“[s]ociety’s well-being in matters of health, safety, order, morality, economics, and
politics”).
201. Blair, supra note 171, at 101; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 73.
202. Blair, supra note 171, at 101-02.
203. Id. at 101.
204. Id. at 102.
205. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 73.
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debate. When the benefits of ILC commercial affiliation are weighed
against the opposition’s dearth of evidence of increased risk from
commercial affiliation, the conclusion seems clear: mixed banking and
commerce as permitted by the ILC structure is neither a risk to the
banking industry nor against public policy or the public interest. Thus,
the issue should not be whether ILCs create a greater risk to the safety
and soundness of the banking industry. Rather, the question should be
that same question the FDIC asks with every deposit insurance
applicant: can the risk of a particular ILC applicant be effectively
managed by properly authorized regulators? 206 Such a question should
be answered on a case by case basis, as the FDIC and Utah DFI have
successfully done for the past two decades. 207 Deference should be given
to regulators with experience and a long history of effective supervision.
When asked to comment on Wal-Mart’s Utah ILC application,
Sheldon Woods, President of the Association of Financial Services (the
association representing ILCs), declined to comment on the application
itself, but stated that “if the FDIC and the state of Utah can’t effectively
manage the risk associated with any [ILC applicant], then that is where
the question lies. . . . If that risk cannot be effectively managed, then
[the Association of Financial Services’s] position would be [that] we
support the regulatory environment and [the particular ILC application]
should not be approved.” 208
In the view of this author, Woods offers the best analysis to date. If
the FDIC were to conclude that the risks posed by a Wal-Mart ILC to
both the banking institution and to the industry could not be effectively
managed through FDIC and Utah DFI supervision, then that individual
application should not be approved. Congruently, an entire industry
with a proven and stable regulatory track record 209 should not be
eliminated because the risk posed by one commercially-affiliated ILC
cannot be effectively managed by the FDIC and Utah DFI.
A decision to mix or to not mix banking and commerce by
206. See Blair, supra note 171, at 116-17. Blair’s extensive analysis of the ILC
industry concludes with a question: “Does the mixing of banking and commerce
constitute good public policy? The evidence suggests that the answer is a qualified yes:
with adequate safeguards in place, the careful mixing of banking and commerce can
yield benefits without excessive risk.” Id. at 117.
207. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
208. Industry Outlook: Banking & Finance, UTAH BUS., Mar. 2007, at 67, 72.
209. See supra Parts II.A.2(a), (b).
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eliminating the ILC exception to the BHC Act should likewise not be a
knee-jerk reaction. It should not be made in response to national hostility or animosity toward Wal-Mart 210 or a one-sided protectionist reaction to appease lobbyists 211 and constituents without actually weighing
the issues and the impacts. Ultimately, this is a public policy question
that must be made by Congress and should result in whatever action is
best for the public interest.
The remainder of this Note is dedicated to the analysis of the
formally proposed legislative amendments to the ILC exception from the
BHC Act (and any similar proposed legislation that may be on the
horizon) and the impact this legislation would have on the industry and
Utah in particular.
B. House Bill 698: The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007
On May 21, 2007, the House of Representatives voted by a margin
of over ninety-six percent to pass House Bill 698. 212 A look at the bill’s
provisions reveals Congressional support for restricting the escalating
growth of commercially-affiliated ILCs.
House Bill 698 was a compromise on the issue of mixed banking
and commerce, but it still would have banned future ILCs from being
held by holding companies that are “commercial” in nature. 213 In
addition, it would have established the FDIC as the consolidated supervisor of ILCs by granting it power equivalent to that of the Federal
Reserve Board. 214 Finally, House Bill 698 would have placed restrictions on grandfathered-in commercially-affiliated ILCs, prohibiting participation in activities in which they did not partake in before January
28, 2007 and barring the acquisition or establishment of any new
banking branch. 215 Each of these three provisions will be addressed
210. See, e.g., Is Wal-Mart Good For America?: One, Two, Three, Four . . . We
Don’t Want Your Superstore, PBS.org, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/walmart/transform/protest.html; Bianco & Zellner, supra note 130;
Wake-UpWal-Mart.com, The Real Facts About Wal-Mart, http://www.wakeupwalmart.
com/facts/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
211. See Fine, supra note 3, at 1.
212. H.R. Rep. No. 110-698, at 10 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. H5513 (daily ed. May
21, 2007). The vote consisted of 371 ayes and only sixteen nays, amongst whom all
three Utah Congressmen were numbered. Id.
213. H.R. 698 § 51(c)(2).
214. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9 (2007).
215. H.R. 698 § 51(c)(4).
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individually.
1. The “Commercial Bucket”
House Bill 698 aimed to restrict ILC charters to holding companies
deriving fifteen percent of gross, consolidated revenues from “nonfinancial” activities. 216 Thus, despite the lack of evidence of any excess
risk created by ILC commercial affiliation, Congress appears to be intent
on continuing what it reaffirmed in 1999 under Gramm-Leach, 217 by
closing yet another door to the melding of banking and commerce.
Only seven states charter entities identified as [ILCs] by the FDIC:
Utah, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Hawaii, Indiana, and Nevada. 218
Of these seven states, Utah, Nevada, and Hawaii are the only states still
chartering new ILCs controlled by commercial companies; Indiana no
longer charters any new ILCs and “Minnesota, California, and Colorado
no longer permit commercial companies to acquire or establish
[ILCs].” 219 Further, Hawaii has not chartered any new ILCs in over
fifteen years. 220 Thus, only Utah and Nevada would have been impacted
by this aspect of House Bill 698. 221
(a) Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah
Any future legislation similar to House Bill 698 will immediately
impact those commercial entities that either (i) did not get their ILC
applications approved for FDIC deposit insurance before the grandfathering provisions of the legislation take effect, or (ii) had plans to file
an ILC application with the FDIC but had not done so before the law’s
enactment. Among those companies with ILC applications pending
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 10.
Aside from the extensive discussion on Utah’s ILC industry, it should also be
noted that Nevada, home to Harley Davidson’s Eaglemark Savings Bank and Toyota’s
Financial Savings Bank, has a growing ILC industry despite the relatively limited
percentage of total ILC assets, and will likely be adversely impacted by House Bill 698.
Valerie Miller, Industrial Strength: ILC Banks Under Microscope, LAS VEGAS BUS.
PRESS, Apr. 24, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.lvbusinesspress.com/articles/2006/
04/24/news/news03.txt.
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before the FDIC when the first moratorium was enacted in July 2006 –
and which will most likely be banned by any “commercial bucket” – are:
Wal-Mart; The Home Depot; Ford Motor Company; Berkshire
Hathaway; DaimlerChrysler Corp.; Ceridian Corp.; CapitalSource, Inc.;
Marlin Business Services Corp.; Cargill Financial Services;
BlueCross/Blue Shield; Security National Master Holding Co.; CompuCredit; WESCOM Credit Union; and Cerberus. 222 These corporations –
unlike some of their competitors, such as automakers General Motors,
BMW and Toyota – are therefore unable to yield the additional level of
profits that would result from conducting the entire transaction (from
design to manufacturing to selling to financing) under the same corporate umbrella.
ILCs controlled by financial holding companies, however, hold
over ninety percent of ILC assets and deposits. 223 Furthermore, while
much has been said about the disproportionate concentration of resources and monopolistic market control by commercial companies
controlling an ILC, ILCs in general are home to only 1.4 percent of all
FDIC-insured assets. 224 The combination of these two statistics reveals
that ILCs controlled by non-financial holding companies, i.e. commercial entities, make up only one tenth of 1.4 percent of the total market
for banking assets, or 0.14 percent. The impact of any “commercial
bucket” in future legislation mirroring House Bill 698, therefore, will
not be as significant for the ILC industry as a whole and the states that
charter them as it is for the commercial companies themselves.
The “commercial bucket” of House Bill 698 would have restricted
charters in the state of Utah that were never granted by the FDIC in the
first place due to the moratoria. 225 Going forward, however, aside from
the foregone jobs that would have developed in Utah as commercial
companies received charters, the biggest impact of any future passage of
legislation similar to House Bill 698 will likely befall those communities
that benefit from the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).226
Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the Utah DFI,
summarized “[t]he CRA is intended to encourage depository institutions
222. See Ford Joins Record ILC Parade, ICBA WASH. WKLY. REP., June 30, 2006,
available at http://www.icba.org/publications/NewsletterDetailWWR.cfm?ItemNumber
=22727&sn.ItemNumber=13783#n150712.
223. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155; Sutton, supra note 26.
224. See Powell, supra note 179, at 2.
225. See infra Part III.B.2(a).
226. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
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to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate,
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods” by requiring banks
to contribute to their respective communities by either creating lending
programs for low-income individuals or investing in municipal bonds,
housing projects, or educational developments. 227 ILCs are not exempt
from the CRA and Utah is one of the few remaining states that continues
to examine its banks for CRA compliance. 228 Thus, Utah ILCs substantially contribute to their communities through the CRA. Any future
limitations on the growth of the ILC industry will impact Utah’s
communities as well as its economy. 229
2. The FDIC as Consolidated Supervisor
House Bill 698 would have granted the FDIC additional
supervisory powers equivalent to those of the Federal Reserve 230 and
established the FDIC as the consolidated supervisor of ILC holding
companies not already subject to consolidated regulation by another
federal regulator. 231 Such supervisory authority would have empowered
the FDIC to require either a regulatory agency or a holding company
that controls an ILC to provide any information necessary to: (1) assess
the risk to the ILC, or (2) determine its condition. 232 In tandem, the
GAO Report “advocates that ILCs and their holding companies be
regulated in a similar manner as other insured depository institutions and
their holding companies.” 233 Therefore, House Bill 698 would have
implemented policy that the Federal Reserve Board and other industry
observers championed as necessary to ensure that the FDIC, once it
became the consolidated regulator of ILCs, could supervise its banking
institutions adequately. 234

227.
228.

Nolan, supra note 91, at 195; 12 C.F.R. § 563e.11(b) (2007).
Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Indus. Banks, Utah DFI,
in Salt Lake City, Utah (June 21, 2007). The Utah DFI conducts its CRA compliance
reviews between every three to five years. Id.
229. Id.
230. H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 11.
231. H.R. 698 § 2(b); H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 9, 14.
232. H.R. 698 § 2(b); H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 17-18.
233. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
234. See id. at 9.
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(a) Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah
The FDIC has repeatedly emphasized, and other industry analysts
have chronicled, the FDIC’s proven supervisory track record indicating
that the FDIC already possesses adequate supervisory power to regulate
the risks of ILCs. 235 Consequently, it is unclear what additional effects
or restrictions House Bill 698’s proposed additional regulatory powers
would have placed on ILCs. In response to criticisms of the FDIC’s
oversight of parent companies of ILCs, Powell stated that the FDIC can
and does “visit the parent companies – and other affiliated entities, for
that matter – to look over issues or operations that could impact the
insured institution. Congress has given [the FDIC] the power to protect
the integrity of those relationships. [The FDIC has] exercised that
power . . . .” 236 Thus, if the FDIC has already supervised ILC holding
companies and their non-banking affiliates, it is unlikely that this
provision of House Bill 698 would have had any significant impact on
the ILC industry. Moreover, because of the Utah DFI’s preexisting
regulatory relationship with the FDIC, it is unlikely that its local
examination procedures and operations will be significantly altered by a
parallel provision in any future legislation.
3. Activity and Branching Limitations
The activity and branching limitations under House Bill 698 would
have applied to commercially-affiliated ILCs grandfathered in under the
legislation. 237 First, these restrictions prevented a grandfathered-in commercial ILC from engaging in any activities in which it was not engaged
as of January 28, 2007. 238 Second, a commercial ILC would not have
been permitted to “acquire, establish, or operate any branch, deposit
production office, loan production office, automated teller machine, or
remote service unit in any State other than the home State of the [ILC]”
unless the ILC had branched into that state prior to January 28, 2007.239
Third, House Bill 698 would have authorized a federal supervisor to
order a holding company or a non-bank subsidiary to terminate an
activity or its ownership of the non-bank subsidiary if the activity or
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra Part II.A.2(a).
Powell, supra note 179.
H.R. 698 § 51(f).
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ownership of the subsidiary represents a serious risk to the depository
institution. 240
(a) Impact on the ILC Industry and Utah
These activity and branching limitations were a direct protection of
community banks and were designed to prevent further expansion by
ILCs – either through branching or marketing new products – into markets where, in Congress’s opinion, their presence is undesired. Powell
has quite accurately and succinctly stated, however, that “fear of competition should not be the compelling argument in formulating good public
policy.” 241 Further, as the Utah DFI noted, placing restrictions on the
activities of commercial ILCs “is unnecessary, anti-competitive, not in
the best interest of consumers, and stifles innovation in the market
place.” 242
The possible effects of any similar activity and branching limitations in the future are important for both commercial ILCs and their
customers. Some of the major advantages to ILC ownership are the
economies of scale and scope. 243 The ability to offer a broader range of
banking products and services to preexisting clients allows both the ILC
holding company and the consumer to reap the savings benefits of
convenience and efficiency. Activity restrictions, on the contrary, prevent marketplace ingenuity and diminish incentives for ILCs to develop
improved products that better suit the needs of their consumers,
especially as technology changes the future marketplace. These restrictions, if passed in a future bill, will essentially freeze commercial ILCs
while the rest of the banking industry moves forward and adapts its
products and services to technological and economic advances.
Additionally, the affiliates of a commercial ILC could also be
restricted in the activities in which they are permitted to engage, or the
ILC’s holding company could run the risk of divestment if the activity
jeopardizes the safety and soundness of the banking institution. 244
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Powell, supra note 179, at 4.
UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., RESPONSE TO THE FDIC’S DECISION ON ITS
MORATORIUM ON INDUSTRIAL LOAN CO. APPLICATIONS (Jan. 31, 2007), http://168.177.
228.15/newsrelease01%2D2007.htm.
243. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
244. H.R. 698 § 2(b).
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While this type of activity limitation is precisely what the BHC Act
proscribes for bank holding companies, 245 such a restriction on ILC
holding companies and their affiliates could significantly impact an ILC
holding company of whose business banking is only a minor portion.
Further, activity limitations also run counter to overall holding company
stability derived from broad diversification amongst subsidiaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the disastrous wake of the unprecedented string of corporate
scandals and subsequent insolvencies culminated by the collapse of
Enron in December 2001, Congress swiftly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (“SOX”). 246 In hindsight, the “hastily enacted and farreaching legislation and subsequent regulations, which carry major ramifications for business, productivity, and competitiveness” may ultimately carry costs which far outweigh their purported benefits. 247 Not unlike
SOX, House Bill 698 and any potential offspring proposed in Congress
in the future would appear to follow the same reactionary legislative
vein in response to the massive outcry to Wal-Mart’s ILC application:
too much response for too small a problem. 248 Although it is presently
politically au courant to oppose all things Wal-Mart, 249 the passage of
House Bill 698 would have ultimately paralyzed the future growth of an
industry that provides specialized and evolving financial products that
are in demand by consumers in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, House Bill 698 cleared only one of several legislative
hurdles by being passed by the House. Senator Bob Bennett (R-UT) 250 ,
a senior member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and

245.
246.

See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
See Beverly Earle & Gerald E. Madek, The New World of Risk For Corporate
Attorneys and Their Board Posts – Sarbanes-Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a
Prescription For Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 189 (2005).
247. Id. A study has shown “that for companies with under $1 billion dollars in
revenue the costs of sustaining as a public company increased 130% through fiscal year
2003.” Id. at 218. Further, “the survey showed that these costs appear to be continuing
and may even be increasing.” Id.
248. It is interesting to note that SOX was enacted without amendment by a vote of
423-3 in the House and 99-0 in the Senate. Id. at 189. House Bill 698 passed the
House with similar approval by a margin of 371 to sixteen. See supra note 214.
249. See supra note 212.
250. Senator Bob Bennett, http://www.senate.gov/~bennett/.
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Urban Affairs, 251 among others, will likely lead a charge aimed at
toning down the unnecessarily over-reactive legislative impact of any
future legislation paralleling House Bill 698. By giving more deference
to the supervisory success of the FDIC, the historic stability of
commercially-affiliated ILCs and the benefits conferred upon consumers
through the controlled mixing of banking and commerce, Congress will
more accurately distinguish between hostility directed at Wal-Mart and
the actual supervisory concerns and unmanaged risks created by ILCs
generally and commercial ILCs specifically. In the absence of any risk
peculiar to commercially-affiliated ILCs, and in light of the regulatory
success of the FDIC and Utah DFI, a wall of separation should not be
erected between ILCs and commercial holding companies. Rather, ILCs
should continue to receive FDIC insurance provided there is a sufficient
regulatory framework to manage the risks inherent in the commerce and
banking affiliation.

251. See S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs Home Page, http://banking.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=information.membership (last visited June 23,
2007).

